Four Points of Interoperability and Adobe
I had the opportunity last week to not only share a stage with Microsoft's Jason Matusow in Geneva, but also to enjoy dinner with him and some time to chat before that as well. Jason is a good guy, and I enjoyed the opportunity to kick things around face to face that we've sometimes taken different positions on in our blogs. Obviously, we have different opinions on the ODF/Open XML debate, but fewer than you might expect (and perhaps fewer than he expected).
While we were exchanging views on open standards and open source with others at the conference, though, things were apparently falling apart in the ongoing negotiations between Microsoft and Adobe. Frankly, although there may be more to the story that I don't know, it seems to me as if Adobe is in the wrong on this one. Adobe wanted its Adobe Acrobat product to become the dominant product in the marketplace for saving documents in a locked format - the de facto standard for creating such documents. In order to achieve that goal, it allowed aspects of its product to become the basis for what became an ISO/IEC adopted standard, which would involve providing licenses in a non-discriminatory fashion to whoever wanted one. Once that happened, Adobe is under an obligation to make such a license available to everyone on substantially equivalent terms - which in this case would presumably be free, given that Apple and OpenOffice.org are bundling "save to PDF" capabilities in their offerings.
What more could there be to the story? One possibility is that the ISO/IEC PDF standard (what the standards world calls a "de jure" standard, or a standard "as law," because it has been adopted by a formal standards body) sits inside a larger "de facto" standard created by Adobe that the market likes. Since only the elements that are within the ISO/IEC standard are subject to obligatory license, Adobe would be free to charge whatever it wants, and to whom, for the additional de facto elements. Such "proprietary extensions," added by the dominant market player, are one way that a company that offers royalty-free technology for inclusion into a standard makes money. In effect, the technology included in the de jure standard that is available under a free license is used to bait the hook for the royalty-bearing license required to implement the full de facto standard. If this is the rest of the story, there is some irony in the fact that Microsoft has frequently been criticized for adding proprietary extensions to products it has built to a standard, thereby sometimes making them non-interoperable with other products built to the same standard.
Interestingly enough, this latest speed bump for Vista highlights a point that Jason and I had crossed blog swords over not long ago, which is my view of the importance of standards as a means of achieving interoperability over other means of achieving the same end. Back on May 8, I posted an entry where I objected to the promotion of the idea by Microsoft of other techniques as a surrogate for, as compared to a supplement to, standards as a means to achieve and guarantee interoperability. My starting point was a quote in an eWeek article to the following effect:
"You can achieve interoperability in a number of ways," said [Microsoft's] Robertson. Among them: joint collaboration agreements, technology licensing and interoperability pacts.
I had heard the same basic statement from another Microsoft representative, which troubled me, because while these other means can result in interoperability, they don't guarantee equality of opportunity and access the way that a standard does that has been adopted by a standards organization with an effective IPR policy - as has just been amply demonstrated by Adobe's apparently discriminatory withholding of a free PDF output license from Microsoft.